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Explicit and Implicit Targets in Open Economies 
Abstract
Under a flexible inflation targeting regime, should policymakers avoid any reaction to 
movements in the foreign exchange market? Using data for six advanced open economies 
explicitly targeting inflation, the paper examines empirically whether real exchange rate 
disequilibria systematically affect the conduct of monetary policy. Estimates indicate that 
monetary policy responses in inflation–targeting, open economies have changed 
significantly, as the institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy has evolved. 
In particular, an explicit target for core inflation and a greater use of the expectation channel 
of monetary policy appear to be key features of the newest policy framework. In this context, 
central banks are unlikely to react to regular fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
JEL Classification Numbers:E40, E52, E58
Keywords: Inflation targeting; interest rate rules; exchange rates; monetary policy.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
In a number of industrial countries, an inflation targeting regime has been instrumental in 
taming inflation and stabilizing the economy, and appears to have gained considerable 
credibility over time.1 Central banks have generally operated a flexible inflation targeting 
regime, smoothing interest rate adjustments over a “reasonable” time horizon, while taking 
into consideration both variability in output and variability in inflation.2 In most cases, recent 
measures have further improved both the flexibility and the transparency of the policy 
framework, thus enhancing guidance to the markets.3
An unsettled issue in inflation–targeting open economies remains, however, whether 
deviations of the real exchange rate from equilibrium should be taken into account in 
formulating monetary policy. Under a flexible inflation targeting regime, should 
policymakers focus solely on domestic variables and avoid any reaction to movements in the 
foreign exchange market? Or is it correct to claim that “a substantial appreciation of the real 
exchange rate [...] furnishes a prima facie case for relaxing monetary policy,” as argued by 
Obsteld and Rogoff (1995, pp. 93)? The primacy of inflation targeting entails that, as soon as 
1
 Over the 1990’s, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, all 
changed the institutional framework under which monetary policy was conducted, by shifting 
to an inflation targeting regime. Norway and Iceland followed suit in 2001. The literature on 
the institutional aspects of inflation targeting in industrial countries is extremely vast. For a 
recent review, see Bernanke and Woodford (2005) and references therein.
2
 Svensson (2000), for example, analyzes the properties of a flexible inflation targeting 
regime in an open economy context.
3
 On recently introduced measures enhancing the transparency of Norway’s monetary 
framework and related discussion, see IMF (2005a). Analogous discussions for Sweden and 
the United Kingdom can be found in IMF (2004, 2005b), respectively.
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macroeconomic indicators suggest that inflationary pressures begin to surfacing, the 
monetary authority should start a gradual policy tightening. Indeed, delays in rising interest 
rates might undermine the credibility of the inflation targeting framework itself. In practice, 
however, the room for maneuver of open economies’ policymakers is likely to be constrained 
by the need to avoid an exchange rate appreciation that would damage the traded goods 
sector. Should this prospect make a case against an immediate policy tightening?
Using data for six advanced open economies explicitly targeting inflation (e.g., Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), this paper examines 
empirically whether deviations of the exchange rate from equilibrium systematically affect 
the conduct of monetary policy. For this purpose, we first assess the role of the exchange rate 
as information variable into the policy decision–making process, and then test whether it also 
enters as a separate argument in a forward–looking interest rate reaction function. 
Open economies targeting core inflation do not seem to react to regular fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. Nonetheless, in three out of six cases (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand)—
e.g., in those countries where exports of non–oil commodities play a major role in the 
economy—the real exchange rate emerges as an independent monetary policy target. 
Tellingly, in all cases considered, exchange rate disequilibria appear to be valuable inputs for 
monetary policy decisions. 
Estimates from rolling regressions also indicate that monetary policy responses in inflation–
targeting open economies have varied significantly over time. As the institutional framework 
for the conduct of monetary policy has evolved over recent years, the parameterization of 
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interest rate reaction functions has changed accordingly. The use of an explicit target for core 
inflation and a greater use of the expectation channel of monetary policy appear to be key 
features of the newest policy framework. We interpret this evidence as an indication that
central banks’ credibility has increased over time and is now well established. At the same 
time, putting private sector perceptions about the stability of monetary policies at center stage 
highlights the importance of central bank communication. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the standard framework of 
analysis of forward–looking monetary reaction functions. The model is generalized to an 
interest rate rule explicitly allowing for real exchange rates to act both as information 
variables and as monetary policy targets. Inter alia, alternative targets for inflation and a 
range of proxies for the output gap are here examined. Section III reports the main empirical 
results from estimating standard forward–looking rules as well as augmented forward–
looking Taylor rules, which takes into account possible exchange rate targeting. For each 
country, the actual and the implied value of the policy interest rate under the standard and the 
augmented monetary reaction function are shown. Finally, changes in central banks’ 
behavior over time are analyzed by presenting results from rolling regressions, in which 
parameter estimates are reported over successive forty–quarter windows. The results are open 
to several interpretations, which are discussed in the concluding section.
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II.   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Extensive academic work on monetary policy tends to characterize conduct in terms of 
interest rate rules and consequences in stylized models embedding these rules.4 According to 
this framework, short–term money market rates are set to stabilize domestic variables—such 
as price inflation and real output—around their equilibrium path. Several contributions 
within the so–called New Keynesian synthesis have shown that—under quite general 
conditions—a simple, inward–looking, interest rate rule can be regarded as an optimal policy 
response for a closed economy.5 Less attention has been paid to the choice of monetary 
policy objectives in an open economy context, given that an open economy is isomorphic to a 
closed economy whenever the exchange rate pass–through to import prices is complete.6 In 
other words, under complete exchange rate flexibility, open economies’ policymakers should 
also be focused uniquely on domestic targets. Unfortunately, there is extensive evidence 
that—in reality—departures from the law of one price for traded goods prices are large and 
pervasive.7 Under these circumstances, policy choices are hardly independent of exchange 
rate dynamics and monetary conduct is liable to focus on more than just domestic 
4
 See, among others, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Taylor (1993, 2000), and Woodford 
(2001).
5
 See, for example, Taylor (1999) and references therein.
6
 On this point, see Galí and Monacelli (2002).
7
 See, for instance, Rogoff (1996) and Engel (1993, 1999, 2002).
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stabilization.8 Indeed, recent empirical studies provide evidence that exchange rates are 
statistically significant in interest rate rules depicting the reaction function of major 
economies.9
Following a widespread approach in the literature of flexible inflation targeting, this paper 
assumes that central banks face a quadratic loss function over inflation and output.10 Under 
standard conditions, this implies that in each period the monetary authority has a target for 
the nominal money market interest rate *ti , which is a function of the gaps between expected 
inflation and output from their respective targets:
( ) ( )* * * ,yt t tt k t ki i E E y   + +   = + 
  + 
    (1) 
where *i  is the desired nominal rate of interest when both inflation and output are at their 
target levels; ( )tt kE  + 
  denotes the expectations of inflation at time t k+ ; and 
( )y tt kE y + 
  denotes corresponding expectations of the output gap at time yt k+ . *  is the 
level of inflation implicitly or explicitly targeted by the central bank, whereas the output gap, 
y , is defined as the difference between the level of real output and its efficient level. The 
coefficients  and  measure the strength of (long–run) policy responses to deviations from 
the target variables. A parameter =0 suggests a pure inflation target, whereby monetary 
8
 Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Monacelli (2003) show that, with incomplete pass-through, 
optimal monetary policy is not purely inward looking. 
9
 See, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) and Chadha, Sarno, and Valente (2004).
10
 See, among others, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Svensson (1997).
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policy is uniquely concerned about price stability and does not aim at stabilizing business 
cycle fluctuations. If  <1, policy is attempting to accommodate inflationary shocks, which—
over the long run—will lead to instability as real rates respond perversely to inflationary 
disturbances.11
However, central banks are likely to react gradually to expected deviations from targets, by 
smoothing their policy rate adjustments over several periods.12 To account for this behavior, 
the interest rate rule (1) is modified by allowing for a second–order partial adjustment to the 
target rate, namely: 
[ ] *( ) 1 ( ) ,t t s t ti L i L i v = +  + (2) 
where ( )L  is generalized to a second–order polynomial, L is the lag operator, *ti  is the 
target rate whose behavior is described by equation (1), and tv  is a zero–mean interest rate 
shock. Combining equations (1) and (2) yields an expression for the standard forward–
looking Taylor rule, e.g. 
[ ] ( ) ( ){ }( ) 1 ( ) ,yt t s t t tt k t ki L i L E E y v      + +   = +  + 
 + 
 +     (3) 
11
 Christiano and Gust (2000) emphasize that a high inflation expectations trap may arise if 
policy accommodates inflation.
12
 Sack and Wieland (2000) provide an in depth discussion of interest rate smoothing. On the 
issue of gradualism as optimal response to uncertainty, see Brainard (1967) as canonical 
reference on the theory side, Woodford (1999) for a recent application, and Walsh (2003) for 
an exhaustive review.
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which, in turn, allows direct inference of the policy responses,  and , and derivation of the 
implied (ex–ante) equilibrium real interest rate, ( )* *1r   =   , if the inflation target is 
known. So far, the only innovation in this policy rule specification regards the inclusion of 
two (rather than one) lagged terms in the interest rate. As discussed below, this more flexible 
dynamic structure provides a better description of some of the changes in monetary responses 
over time.
It is under debate whether and how exchange rates (and asset prices, in general) should be 
taken into account in formulating monetary policy.13 While it is unanimously recognized that 
exchange rates are useful indicators of inflationary pressures in the economy (because 
changes in the exchange rate feed through into domestic prices and affect aggregate demand), 
central bankers have often been explicit about the fact that exchange–rate stabilization is not 
a direct target of policy. To assess whether this is really how they act, the interest rate rule (3) 
is further generalized to allow for policymakers’ responses to exchange rate disequilibria:
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) 1 ( ) ,y et t s t t t tt k t k t ki L i L E E y E e        + + +     = +  + 
 + 
 + 
 +     %% %  (4) 
where et ke +  denotes the forward–looking real exchange rate. In line with recent empirical 
literature, purchasing power parity (PPP) is assumed to hold in the long run, so that the real 
exchange rate follows a persistent, albeit stationary, process. The equilibrium real exchange 
13
 See Taylor (2001) and Goodhart (2001).
Page 8 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
rate can thus be captured by a constant included in the intercept term %  of the “augmented 
interest rate rule” (4), implying that central banks attempt to correct expected misalignments 
from PPP. If the real exchange rate is expressed as the domestic price of foreign currency, the 
resulting monetary rule will stabilize it if  > 0, as an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
will require a cut in the short–term interest rate. Under the augmented specification, the 
implied (ex–ante) equilibrium real interest rate will hence be identified only if both the 
inflation target and the equilibrium real exchange rate are known: ( )* * *1r e   =   +%% .
Under rational expectations, central banks form their forecasts of future inflation, output gap, 
and real exchange rate using all relevant information available at the time the interest rate is 
set. Let zt denote the vector of indicators comprising the central bank’s information set at that 
time (i.e., t t
z ). If the monetary authority adjusts the interest rate according to the 
augmented interest rate rule (4), while forming expectations of future variables in a fully 
rational manner, then there must exist a set of parameters { }1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , ,     %% % % %  such that the 
residuals obtained from the estimation of equations (4) are orthogonal to the information set 
available, zt. Formally, 0t tE   = z . This set of orthogonality conditions forms the basis of 
the estimates, using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). In addition, the validity of 
the set of instruments used can be tested by means of overidentifying restrictions, provided 
the number of instruments in zt is greater than the number of parameters to be estimated. 
The dataset comprises quarterly data from January 1984 to June 2004 for six inflation 
targeting, open economies: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the 
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United Kingdom. The baseline inflation measure is the annual core inflation rate ( CORE ), as 
reported by national monetary authorities. Because this measure is generally available only 
over recent periods, the series were extended backwards using the fourth differences in the 
log of CPI, as reported by the IFS database. Results are however also described using fourth 
differences in the log of CPI series ( CPI ) throughout the sample. Figure 1 plots the 
instrument interest rate for each of the six countries against measures of underlying and 
headline inflation.14 Standard deviations of the countries’ policy rates are estimated in the 
order of 1 percent, with the exception of New Zealand, where the volatility is slightly higher 
(around 1.3 percent). 
As for the output gap, the preferred indicator is the growth gap ( DGAPy ), given recent findings 
on the optimal policy response to potential output uncertainty (Orphanides and van Norden, 
2002). Results are also reported for two alternative measures of the output gap: the Hodrick–
Prescott filter for the level of real output ( HPy ), and the real unit labor cost after adjusting for 
wage markup ( ARMCy ), constructed as documented in Galí, Gertler, and López–Salido (2001). 
Figure 2 seems to confirm that the three output gap series are, overall, positively 
correlated.15, 16 Finally, for all countries, misalignments from PPP are proxied by the logs of 
14
 In the case of Australia and New Zealand, both inflation measures correct for the large 
effects of the goods and services taxes (introduced in 2000 in Australia and in 1986 in New 
Zealand). As a result, headline inflation in these countries tends to resemble more closely 
core inflation.
15
 Our measures of activity refer to the whole economy. As such, they do not correct for 
sizable supply-side shocks to the agriculture sector.
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the real effective exchange rates based on CPI, given that real effective exchange rates series 
based on unit labor costs were not available for all countries.
III.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 reports GMM estimates of the parameters { }1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,     in the standard forward–
looking Taylor rule (3), where only expected inflation and expected output gap are 
considered as explanatory variables. The target horizon is assumed to be one quarter for both 
inflation and the output gap (i.e. 1yk k = = ), although results look qualitatively unaffected 
by this choice (not reported). The instrument set, tz , includes a constant, a world commodity 
price index, and four lags of the policy rate, inflation, and the output gap. In estimating the 
model for Norway and Sweden, the 1993Q1 and the 1992Q4 interest rate observations, 
respectively, are dummied out as extreme and unsystematic monetary tightening episodes 
dealing with the 1992–1993 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis.
Estimation results yield parameter values broadly consistent with previous findings reported 
by the literature for inflation targeting countries. In particular, for Norway, New Zealand, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, for each of the specifications considered, the estimate of 
is always correctly signed, strongly significant, and greater than unity, while the estimate of 
16 In all cases, pairwise correlations between the Hodrick-Prescott output gap ( HPy ) and the 
growth gap measure ( DGAPy ) are statistically significant, ranging between 0.46 (for the 
United Kingdom) and 0.65 (for New Zealand). For all countries, the adjusted real unit labor 
cost ( ARMCy ) exhibits the least synchronized behavior with the other two gap measures; in the 
case of Sweden and the United Kingdom, it appears to be uncorrelated with the HP filter, 
although positively and significantly correlated with the growth gap.
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is not statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels. This implies that 
central banks in these countries have responded only to deviations of expected inflation from 
target, not to the expected output gap, which is consistent with a pure inflation targeting 
regime.17 As for Australia, the estimate of  is strongly significant and greater than unity, but 
there is also some evidence that monetary policy aims to stabilize expected business cycle 
fluctuations. The evident outlier is Canada, for which monetary policy responses to both 
inflation and output gap are much stronger than in other countries, though the parameters are 
estimated with far less precision. Likely, shifts in the behavior of the Canadian monetary 
authority may not be described accurately by the framework at hand. Indeed, the close link 
with the United States may have forced the Bank of Canada to have a watchful eye on the 
U.S. Federal Reserve’s behavior, whereas our current interest rate reaction function does not 
account for any systematic response to the U.S. monetary policy stance.
For all specifications and for each country, the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected, 
with the Hansen test supporting the validity of the information set used. Given that the 
instrument set used comprises four lags in the log of the real effective exchange rate, the 
result of this test can be interpreted as follows: under the null hypothesis, the central bank 
adjusts the interest rate according to the reaction function (3), with the expectations of future 
inflation and output based on the relevant information available at time t. The assumption 
17
 For the United Kingdom, this holds true in five out of six specifications, while the estimate 
of  becomes significant when the output gap is proxied by the HP filter and price changes 
are measured by core inflation. The same exception remains valid in Table 2, when 
deviations from PPP are also allowed for.
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that inflation and output gap forecasts are also based on available information from the 
foreign exchange market cannot be statistically rejected. 
Next, the parameters { }1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,    %% % %  for the six countries in our sample are estimated using 
an augmented interest rate rule such as (4). The target horizon for the three forward–looking 
variables—inflation, output gap, and real exchange rate—is still assumed to be one (i.e.,
1y ek k k = = = ). The results of the GMM estimation are reported in Table 2, using 
alternative measures of inflation and output gap. In all countries except the United Kingdom, 
there is some evidence that—over the sample—real exchange rate movements have direct 
explanatory power in characterizing interest rate changes. In Norway and in Sweden, 
deviations from PPP play a role in explaining interest rate movements only if the monetary 
authority is believed to target headline rather than core inflation. Only in those economies 
that are commonly lumped together as the “commodity currencies” (e.g., Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand), the real exchange rate yields significant (and correctly signed) parameter 
estimates, even when the central bank is assumed to stabilize core inflation. However, it is 
worth noticing that in countries where exports of non–oil commodities play a major role, 
exchange rate fluctuations are likely to reflect changes in the equilibrium exchange rate due 
to commodity prices shocks rather than deviations of the REER from equilibrium (Chen and 
Rogoff, 2003). Under these circumstances, monetary authorities are unlikely to smooth 
exchange rate volatility through changes in the interest rate (Clinton, 2001). Unfortunately, 
our empirical framework cannot distinguish between different sources of exchange rate 
fluctuations, as it implicitly assumes a time–invariant REER equilibrium.
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Overall, the inclusion of exchange rate disequlibria do not seem to affect appreciably the 
model’s interest rate predictions. To aid interpretation of the results, Figure 3 shows, for each 
country, the actual interest rate and its estimated value implied by the baseline standard 
forward–looking Taylor rule (Table 1) and by the preferred augmented interest rule 
specification allowing also for exchange rate responses (Table 2). The interest rates implied 
by the estimated rules characterize well the behavior of the actual rates. Indeed, both 
specifications of the reaction function satisfactorily trace the dynamics of the interest rates. 
The simple visual inspection of the models’ predictions suggests that the contribution of real 
exchange rate disequilibria is not sufficient to distinguish between the two models. 
Interestingly, even for Australia and New Zealand—where deviations from PPP play a 
slightly greater role in explaining interest rate movement, given our preferences for 
measuring inflation and output gap—it is the standard Taylor rule to provide better fit over 
the latest quarters of the sample. This suggests that central banks have been recently inclined 
to ignore real exchange rate misalignments. 
A more flexible approach to inflation targeting implies that central banks can decide to apply 
a somewhat longer period for bringing inflation back to target. The horizon for achieving the 
inflation target implicitly provides some indication of how much weight the central bank 
gives to stability in the real economy. Considerable emphasis on stability in the real 
economy—at the expenses of somewhat greater and more persistent deviations from the 
inflation target—implies a relatively longer horizon. A precondition for a longer monetary 
policy horizon is that financial market participants are confident that inflation will be low and 
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stable over time. Indeed, financial market confidence in the inflation target provides central 
banks with greater scope for promoting stability in the real economy.
Monetary authority’s scope of maneuver tends to increase as the inflation target succeeds in 
providing an anchor for the formation of inflation expectations and, in particular, for the 
wage bargaining process. This creates a role for regular central bank communication to help 
markets filter macroeconomic news. However, in situations where there is a risk that 
inflation may deviate considerably from the target over a lengthy periods, or confidence in 
monetary policy is in jeopardy, a rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate may 
remain appropriate.
The results confirm the view that central banks tend to smooth the adjustment of interest 
rates over several quarters, thereby increasing the predictability of monetary policy conduct. 
However, the extent to which central banks rely on smoothing appears to differ across 
countries and over time. In particular, for Australia, Norway, and Sweden, the coefficient on 
the first lag appears to be close to one, while the second lag displays a significant corrective
behavior, signaling more elongated and predictable interest rate movements in response to 
changes in the macroeconomic environment and, hence, a greater use of the expectation 
channel of monetary policy. Previous work in this area indicates that the strength of the 
expectation channel relates to the degree of forward–looking behavior in the rest of the 
economy, which—in turn—can be seen as the policymaker’s reward for ensuring monetary 
stability.18 Figure 4—plotting parameter estimates from rolling regressions over successive 
18
 On this point, see also Bayoumi and Sgherri (2004a, 2004b).
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forty–quarter windows—shows that, in this respect, Norges Bank (and, to a lesser extent, the 
Swedish Riksbank) has enjoyed the greatest confidence gains over recent times, possibly in 
connection with its latest switch to a longer adjustment horizon. At the other end of the 
spectrum is New Zealand (and, to a lesser extent, Canada), for which the degree of 
smoothing seems to be lower. 
Central banks’ response to real exchange rate misalignments have varied over time. Indeed, 
the sample period 1984Q1–2004Q2 transcends several different monetary regimes for almost 
all countries in the sample. Rolling–window estimates of the exchange rate responses (Figure 
5) suggest that, even if the level of the implied instrument rate is very similar to the one 
implied by the standard forward–looking Taylor rule, central banks in each of the six 
countries have effectively targeted the exchange rate at some point over the sample. Norway
and Sweden, for example, have been concerned about exchange rate misalignments until the 
first half of the 1990s. Over the last decade, however, interest rate responses to deviations of 
exchange rates from target have become statistically insignificant. Conversely, for the United 
Kingdom, exchange rate disequilibria have been important in determining the interest rate 
target around the sterling devaluation of 1992 and during the protracted sterling appreciation 
of the mid– to late 1990s. As suggested below, the statistical significance of the central 
bank’s reaction to exchange rate disequilibria may in fact reflect the size of the disequilibria 
themselves, rather than the formal monetary regime actually in place.19
19
 A similar argument is suggested by Chadha, Sarno, and Valente (2004).
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IV.   DISCUSSION
Inflation targeting is now a well established framework for the conduct of monetary policy. 
The experience of advanced open economies has been that the period of inflation targeting 
has delivered favorable economic outcomes. According to surveys, medium–term 
inflationary expectations in these countries remain well anchored, thereby contributing to 
stabilizing inflation around the target and amplifying the effects of monetary policy itself. 
Expectations concerning inflation and economic stability are indeed of crucial importance for 
both wage–price formation and the stability of the foreign exchange market. 
Inflation targeting has evolved over time across a number of dimensions, notably the degree 
of flexibility and the approach to communication. The evidence seems to confirm that, across 
advanced open economies, the regime has recently become more flexible, allowing greater 
scope for inflation to vary around the target and, as a result, for broader macroeconomic 
goals to be taken into account. As central banks have started to smooth the adjustment of 
interest rates over a longer horizon, the predictability of monetary policy conduct has also 
increased. In addition, monetary authorities have gradually become more and more 
transparent, improving the scope of their communication and delivering it in more varied 
forms. 
Although with some significant differences across countries, the paper finds that exchange 
rates are generally not key for systematic monetary responses in inflation–targeting, open 
economies. More precisely, if a country attempts to target core (rather than headline) 
inflation, the exchange rate does not seem to enter as a separate argument in interest rate rule. 
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At the same time, however, exchange rates are found to be valuable inputs into the monetary 
policy decision–making process, as information variables.
As stressed by Taylor (2001), there may be two reasons why central banks’ actions in open 
economies are better described by interest rate rules not entailing a direct response to the 
exchange rate. First, if the policy rule is based on (rational) expectations of future inflation 
and output, a short–run appreciation of the exchange rate at time t will be expected to 
translate into lower output and inflation in the future. As such, a policy rule like equation (3) 
will entail a decline in interest rates today, even though the exchange rate does not appear 
directly in the rule. Second, in some situations, changes in the real exchange rate might 
reflect changes in productivity that should not be offset by the monetary policy. As such, 
while fluctuations in the exchange rate may not have much consequences on inflation 
expectations—and thus have little impact on the interest rate through this channel—these 
movements may result in dangerous swings in interest rates if there were a strong direct 
reaction to them.
Finally, our findings may be consistent with the view that, while committed to a flexible 
inflation targeting regime, central banks may still act in response to exchange rates on 
occasions when there is a need to smooth out high volatility in foreign exchange markets that 
could destabilize domestic inflation. Indeed, to detect unsystematic interest rate responses to 
abrupt corrections in the exchange rate (or in any other asset price), a nonlinear framework of 
analysis could be more helpful than a standard linear framework like the one used in this 
paper.
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Table 1: Forward–Looking Taylor Rule 1/ 
Norway 1 2   j–test see 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.585 0.062 1.731 0.002 0.884 1.010 
(0.111) (0.058) (0.099) (0.175) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.555 0.085 1.788 0.007 0.904 1.031 
(0.138) (0.066) (0.107) (0.291) 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.613 0.064 1.739 0.504 0.873 1.003 
(0.109) (0.057) (0.188) (0.586) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.685 0.042 1.780 0.206 0.657 1.051 
(0.116) (0.073) (0.162) (0.311) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.699 0.060 1.738 0.671 0.614 1.051 
(0.134) (0.076) (0.183) (0.669) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.695 0.066 1.845 0.974 0.790 1.111 
(0.115) (0.073) (0.259) (0.740) 
Sweden 1 2   j–test see 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.824 –0.055 1.951 0.321 0.573 0.974 
(0.054) (0.014) (0.178) (0.344) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.901 –0.063 1.900 0.917 0.704 0.925 
(0.080) (0.025) (0.223) (0.618) 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.823 –0.064 1.916 –0.394 0.580 1.003 
(0.054) (0.014) (0.167) (0.448) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.936 –0.094 1.458 0.285 0.657 1.051 
(0.045) (0.014) (0.157) (0.414) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.960 –0.081 1.406 1.594 0.614 1.051 
(0.053) (0.025) (0.196) (0.804) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.949 –0.105 1.518 –0.830 0.790 1.111 
(0.049) (0.013) (0.190) (0.659) 
(continued) 
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Table 1: (continued) 
United Kingdom 1 2   j–test see 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.771 0.013 1.838 0.732 0.570 0.980 
(0.127) (0.082) (0.327) (0.773) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.591 0.124 1.900 1.416 0.665 0.968 
(0.108) (0.067) (0.243) (0.470) 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.777 0.029 1.799 0.667 0.585 0.987 
(0.125) (0.087) (0.361) (0.982) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.604 0.166 1.724 0.144 0.763 0.872 
(0.080) (0.064) (0.203) (0.391) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.642 0.181 1.522 0.872 0.838 0.899 
(0.085) (0.061) (0.320) (0.901) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.611 0.163 1.759 0.294 0.743 0.872 
(0.084) (0.069) (0.217) (0.377) 
Canada 1 2   j–test see 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.835 0.129 5.755 9.318 0.732 1.006 
(0.094) (0.072) (6.372) (15.161) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.717 0.150 2.427 2.762 0.800 0.998 
(0.071) (0.050) (0.548) (0.940) 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.788 0.051 3.165 3.942 0.757 1.072 
(0.094) (0.057) (0.790) (1.641) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.786 0.153 3.328 6.563 0.669 0.988 
(0.106) (0.075) (1.710) (5.222) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.779 0.148 0.190 5.379 0.562 0.934 
(0.082) (0.061) (0.946) (2.806) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.831 0.084 1.980 8.500 0.508 1.047 
(0.111) (0.081) (0.920) (5.261) 
(continued) 
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Table 1: (concluded) 
Australia 1 2   j–test see 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
1.031 –0.104 1.524 3.723 0.767 1.018 
(0.083) (0.080) (0.341) (1.018) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
1.062 –0.141 0.715 3.046 0.865 1.060 
(0.083) (0.081) (0.360) (1.454) 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
1.118 –0.191 1.083 2.705 0.818 1.079 
(0.099) (0.090) (0.490) (1.772) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
1.012 –0.093 1.771 3.441 0.723 0.991 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.355) (0.970) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
1.048 –0.136 0.936 2.573 0.837 1.037 
(0.081) (0.080) (0.335) (1.461) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
1.094 –0.181 1.331 1.959 0.809 1.049 
(0.101) (0.089) (0.420) (1.647) 
New Zealand 1 2   j–test see 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.746 –0.100 1.341 –0.520 0.680 1.388 
(0.120) (0.099) (0.066) (0.211) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.876 –0.196 1.349 –0.081 0.490 1.214 
(0.082) (0.069) (0.072) (0.267) 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.860 –0.192 1.353 –0.117 0.479 1.230 
(0.089) (0.074) (0.095) (0.304) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.751 –0.107 1.328 –0.517 0.725 1.417 
(0.124) (0.104) (0.059) (0.210) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.864 –0.196 1.336 –0.078 0.540 1.228 
(0.079) (0.067) (0.061) (0.273) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.873 –0.198 1.369 0.060 0.530 1.345 
(0.088) (0.074) (0.098) (0.410) 
1/  The estimated parameters refer to equation (3). Estimates are obtained by GMM with 
Heteroskedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent covariance matrix, obtained by nonlinear three–stage 
least squares. The Bartlett kernel is used to weight the covariances in order to ensure the covariance 
matrix to be positive semidefinite. The Newey–West fixed bandwidth is used, so that the weights given 
by the kernel do not change with the autocorrelation in the data. The sample period is 1984Q1 to 
2004Q2. The instruments set includes a constant, the log–difference of a world commodity price index, 
plus 4 lags of output gap, fourth differences in prices, interest rate, and log real effective exchange rate. 
The forward–looking horizon is one quarter for each target variable. J–test is the test for 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982), which is distributed as a ;2 under the null. For this test, 
only p–values are reported. HAC–consistent standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Table 2: Augmented Forward–Looking Taylor Rule 
Norway 1% 2% % %  j–test see 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.608 0.061 1.760 0.643 0.006 0.917 1.051 
(0.120) (0.055) (0.205) (0.514) (0.119) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.571 0.051 1.718 0.198 0.060 0.874 1.028 
(0.147) (0.063) (0.266) (0.339) (0.109) 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.577 0.040 1.716 0.100 0.050 0.848 1.018 
(0.122) (0.055) (0.214) (0.184) (0.098) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.658 0.080 1.714 0.895 0.067 0.715 1.101 
(0.116) (0.072) (0.250) (0.645) (0.114) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.667 0.050 1.435 0.919 0.219 0.517 1.048 
(0.139) (0.069) (0.301) (0.644) (0.125) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.655 0.031 1.533 0.228 0.173 0.574 1.035 
(0.119) (0.069) (0.202) (0.279) (0.084) 
Sweden 1% 2% % %  j–test see 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.839 –0.067 1.668 0.076 0.075 0.538 0.952 
(0.067) (0.019) (0.267) (0.656) (0.070) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.923 –0.065 2.086 1.371 –0.063 0.638 0.937 
(0.094) (0.025) (0.564) (1.475) (0.171) 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.847 –0.058 1.721 0.412 0.075 0.591 0.945 
(0.064) (0.020) (0.229) (0.391) (0.053) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.914 –0.097 1.202 –0.018 0.117 0.663 0.926 
(0.050) (0.013) (0.226) (0.729) (0.076) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.962 –0.081 1.424 1.668 –0.009 0.705 0.914 
(0.061) (0.025) (0.343) (1.417) (0.134) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.892 –0.082 1.165 0.313 0.109 0.609 0.914 
(0.043) (0.015) (0.159) (0.357) (0.045) 
(continued) 
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Table 2: (continued) 
United Kingdom 1% 2% % %  j–test see 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.778 0.031 1.760 0.470 –0.016 0.489 0.989 
(0.121) (0.083) (0.403) (1.315) (0.072) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.615 0.123 1.829 1.502 –0.015 0.561 0.966 
(0.108) (0.067) (0.271) (0.567) (0.035) 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.801 0.008 1.740 0.689 –0.010 0.515 0.993 
(0.128) (0.083) (0.383) (0.974) (0.062) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.608 0.165 1.657 –0.174 –0.033 0.630 0.874 
(0.094) (0.062) (0.217) (0.682) (0.044) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.657 0.180 1.443 1.142 –0.032 0.791 0.908 
(0.097) (0.061) (0.346) (1.118) (0.037) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.650 0.140 1.655 0.092 –0.022 0.634 0.886 
(0.117) (0.070) (0.213) (0.737) (0.045) 
Canada 
1% 2% % %  j–test see 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.730 0.012 1.223 3.459 0.178 0.805 1.121 
(0.104) (0.074) (0.491) (0.868) (0.071) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.640 0.133 0.681 2.141 0.180 0.845 1.018 
(0.087) (0.053) (0.373) (0.502) (0.040) 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.835 0.126 5.339 8.744 0.023 0.648 1.013 
(0.094) (0.074) (6.752) (13.724) (0.390) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.709 0.029 0.427 3.825 0.254 0.958 1.175 
(0.120) (0.100) (0.415) (1.076) (0.065) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.666 0.118 –0.292 2.257 0.251 0.772 0.944 
(0.096) (0.063) (0.407) (0.422) (0.047) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.785 0.145 2.835 5.621 0.049 0.579 0.993 
(0.106) (0.077) (1.600) (4.212) (0.134) 
(continued) 
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Table 2: (concluded) 
Australia 
1% 2% % %  j–test see 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.902 –0.149 1.054 –0.381 0.269 0.570 0.948 
(0.069) (0.066) (0.135) (0.322) (0.035) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.911 –0.120 1.082 0.307 0.277 0.485 0.902 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.158) (0.381) (0.039) 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.996 –0.169 1.108 0.980 0.251 0.749 0.913 
(0.083) (0.075) (0.182) (0.545) (0.043) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.827 –0.099 1.171 –0.596 0.242 0.517 0.923 
(0.072) (0.060) (0.129) (0.369) (0.032) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.880 –0.104 1.231 0.305 0.261 0.454 0.865 
(0.069) (0.067) (0.157) (0.372) (0.036) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.951 –0.142 1.287 0.786 0.245 0.607 0.868 
(0.080) (0.070) (0.173) (0.465) (0.038) 
New Zealand 
1% 2% % %  j–test see 
y=yARMC; =CORE 
0.855 –0.214 1.434 0.552 0.150 0.468 1.301 
(0.077) (0.078) (0.100) (0.336) (0.047) 
y=yHP; =CORE 
0.819 –0.219 1.341 –0.187 0.123 0.430 1.265 
(0.086) (0.078) (0.058) (0.242) (0.044) 
y=yDGAP; =CORE 
0.748 –0.149 1.355 –0.369 0.102 0.581 1.359 
(0.106) (0.098) (0.060) (0.215) (0.046) 
y=yARMC; =CPI 
0.902 –0.224 1.475 0.929 0.158 0.600 1.474 
(0.084) (0.078) (0.110) (0.500) (0.054) 
y=yHP; =CPI 
0.833 –0.225 1.343 –0.124 0.113 0.390 1.251 
(0.091) (0.082) (0.062) (0.274) (0.044) 
y=yDGAP; =CPI 
0.743 –0.142 1.356 –0.375 0.097 0.545 1.335 
(0.121) (0.108) (0.063) (0.212) (0.044) 
1/  The estimated parameters refer to equation (4). Estimates are obtained by GMM with 
Heteroskedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent covariance matrix, obtained by nonlinear three–stage 
least squares. The Bartlett kernel is used to weight the covariances in order to ensure the covariance 
matrix to be positive semidefinite. The Newey–West fixed bandwidth is used, so that the weights given 
by the kernel do not change with the autocorrelation in the data. The sample period is 1984Q1 to 
2004Q2. The instruments set includes a constant, the log–difference of a world commodity price index, 
plus 4 lags of output gap, fourth differences in prices, interest rate, and log real effective exchange rate. 
The forward–looking horizon is one quarter for each target variable. J–test is the test for 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982), which is distributed as a ;2 under the null. For this test, 
only p–values are reported. HAC–consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Interest Rate, Core, and Headline Inflation (percent)
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculation.
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Figure 2: Output Gap Measures 
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculation. 
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Figure 3: Interest Rate: Actual versus Implied (percent)
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculation.
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Figure 4: Interest Rate Smoothing1
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculation.
1 Rolling GMM estimates over successive forty–quarter periods. Dates displayed on the horizontal axes indicate the initial period of the 10–year window.
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Figure 5: Long–term Response to the Real Exchange Rate1
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculation
1 Rolling GMM estimates over successive forty–quarter periods. Dates displayed on the horizontal axes indicate the initial period of the 10–year window.
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